An authenticated caller who can submit /v1/responses requests can supply a request-controlled Jinja chat template despite the trust flag being disabled. The expected fixed behavior is the same as Chat Completions: reject chat_template_kwargs["chat_template"] unless the server was started with --trust-request-chat-template.
Suggested Fix
Add trust_request_chat_template to OpenAIServingResponses.
Pass args.trust_request_chat_template when constructing the Responses serving object.
Reject request.chat_template_kwargs["chat_template"] before rendering when trust is false.
Keep ordinary kwargs such as enable_thinking working.
Add regression tests for default-deny and opt-in-allow behavior on /v1/responses.
Affected Package/Versions
Source sweep found the affected shape in:
v0.16.0
v0.18.0
v0.20.0
v0.21.0
v0.22.0
v0.22.1
v0.23.0
current checkout 470229c37efaf69c86e8bc97482b0b1ff7551c65
current origin/mainb3f0a0a0df76dda92ec4b2c9335f77e84adad911
Suggested affected range:
>= 0.16.0, <= 0.23.0
Appendix: Duplicate Research
This is related to, but distinct from:
GHSA-6fvq-23cw-5628 / CVE-2025-61620
GHSA-69j4-grxj-j64p / CVE-2025-62426
Those advisories establish the security impact of request-controlled Jinja templates and chat_template_kwargs, but they cover older Chat Completions/tokenize implementations. This report covers a current /v1/responses sibling path that still lacks the trust gate.
Local prior submissions this report..029 do not cover this root cause.