Flowise Pre-auth Arbitrary File Upload
GHSA-h42x-xx2q-6v6g · CVE-2025-71333 · 갱신 2026. 7. 8.
영향 받는 패키지
| 생태계 | 패키지 | 수정 버전 |
|---|---|---|
| npm | flowise | 없음 |
GHSA-h42x-xx2q-6v6g · CVE-2025-71333 · 갱신 2026. 7. 8.
| 생태계 | 패키지 | 수정 버전 |
|---|---|---|
| npm | flowise | 없음 |
export const WHITELIST_URLS = [
'/api/v1/verify/apikey/',
'/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/',
'/api/v1/public-chatflows',
'/api/v1/public-chatbotConfig',
'/api/v1/prediction/',
'/api/v1/vector/upsert/',
'/api/v1/node-icon/',
'/api/v1/components-credentials-icon/',
'/api/v1/chatflows-streaming',
'/api/v1/chatflows-uploads',
'/api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download',
'/api/v1/feedback',
'/api/v1/leads',
'/api/v1/get-upload-file',
'/api/v1/ip',
'/api/v1/ping',
'/api/v1/version',
'/api/v1/attachments',
'/api/v1/metrics'
]
This means that every route in the whitelist does not require authentication. Now, let's examine the /api/v1/attachments route.
@ /packages/server/src/routes/attachments/index.ts
const router = express.Router()
// CREATE
router.post('/:chatflowId/:chatId', getMulterStorage().array('files'), attachmentsController.createAttachment)
export default router
After several calls, the request reaches the createFileAttachment function @ (packages/server/src/utils/createAttachment.ts)
Initially, the function retrieves chatflowid and chatId from the request without any additional validation. The only check performed is whether these parameters exist in the request.
const chatflowid = req.params.chatflowId
if (!chatflowid) {
throw new Error(
'Params chatflowId is required! Please provide chatflowId and chatId in the URL: /api/v1/attachments/:chatflowId/:chatId'
)
}
const chatId = req.params.chatId
if (!chatId) {
throw new Error(
'Params chatId is required! Please provide chatflowId and chatId in the URL: /api/v1/attachments/:chatflowId/:chatId'
)
}
Next, the function retrieves the uploaded files and attempts to add them to the storage by calling the addArrayFilesToStorage function.
const files = (req.files as Express.Multer.File[]) || []
const fileAttachments = []
if (files.length) {
// ...
for (const file of files) {
const fileBuffer = await getFileFromUpload(file.path ?? file.key) // get the uploaded file
const fileNames: string[] = []
file.originalname = Buffer.from(file.originalname, 'latin1').toString('utf8')
// add it to the storage
const storagePath = await addArrayFilesToStorage(file.mimetype,
fileBuffer,
file.originalname,
fileNames,
chatflowid, chatId) // add it to the storage
// ...
await removeSpecificFileFromUpload(file.path ?? file.key) // delete from tmp
// ...
fileAttachments.push({
name: file.originalname,
mimeType: file.mimetype,
size: file.size,
content
})
} catch (error) {
throw new Error(`Failed operation: createFileAttachment - ${getErrorMessage(error)}`)
}
}
}
return fileAttachments
Now lets take a look at addArrayFilesToStorage function @ (/packages/components/src/storageUtils.ts)
export const addArrayFilesToStorage = async (mime: string, bf: Buffer, fileName: string, fileNames: string[], ...paths: string[]) => {
const storageType = getStorageType()
const sanitizedFilename = _sanitizeFilename(fileName)
if (storageType === 's3') {
// ...
} else {
const dir = path.join(getStoragePath(), ...paths) // PATH TRAVERSAL.
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
}
const filePath = path.join(dir, sanitizedFilename)
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, bf)
fileNames.push(sanitizedFilename)
return 'FILE-STORAGE::' + JSON.stringify(fileNames)
}
}
As noted in the comment, to construct the directory, the function joins the output of the getStoragePath function with ...paths, which are essentially the chatflowid and chatId extracted earlier from the request.
However, as mentioned previously, these values are not validated to ensure they are UUIDs or numbers. As a result, an attacker could manipulate these variables to set the dir variable to any value.
Combined with the fact that the filename is also provided by the user, this leads to unauthenticated arbitrary file upload.
This is the a HTTP request. As observed, we are not authenticated, and by manipulating the chatId parameter, we can perform a path traversal. In this example, we overwrite the api.json file, which contains the API keys for the system.
in this example, the dir variable will be
var dir = '/root/.flowise/storage/test/../../../../../../../../root/.flowise/'
and the file name is
api.json
And the API Keys in the UI
This vulnerability could potentially lead to