n8n: Race Condition in Git Clone Node Allows Authenticated Users to Achieve Remote Code Execution

Impact

A TOCTOU race condition in the Git node's clone operation lets an authenticated user bypass its path restrictions by swapping a directory for a symlink after the path is validated but before the clone runs. This plants a crafted repository in the community node directory, which n8n loads as a custom node on the next restart, and since nodes execute JavaScript, this yields arbitrary code execution on the server.

Both self-hosted and cloud instances are affected, where authenticated users can create and run workflows using the Git node.

Patches

Users should upgrade to the patched version once available to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

• Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
• Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.
• Restrict network egress from the n8n instance to prevent connections to attacker-controlled git repositories.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.