n8n: Authenticated SSRF via Dynamic Node Parameters Endpoints Allows Internal Network Access

Impact

Endpoints in /rest/dynamic-node-parameters/ lacked authorization scopes, making it reachable by any authenticated user with no workflow creation or execution required.

By supplying an absolute URL in the routing configuration, a caller could override the node type's declared baseURL, defeating the restriction meant to confine requests to the node's own upstream service. With SSRF protection disabled by default (N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false), this let an authenticated user make the n8n server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal targets.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.64, 2.29.8, and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

• Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
• Set N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true to enable SSRF filtering for private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints.
• Restrict network egress from the n8n host to limit reachable internal services.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.