PPTAgent: Arbitrary Code Execution via Python eval() of LLM-Generated Code with Builtins in Scope

Summary

This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00.

CodeExecutor.execute_actions (pptagent/apis.py:126-205) processes LLM-generated slide editing actions using Python's eval():

# pptagent/apis.py:184-186
partial_func = partial(self.registered_functions[func], edit_slide)
if func == "replace_image":
    partial_func = partial(partial_func, doc)
eval(line, {}, {func: partial_func})              # ← builtins accessible

The call eval(line, {}, {func: partial_func}) passes an empty dict as globals. Per Python's language reference: "If the globals dictionary is present and does not contain a value for the key __builtins__, a reference to the dictionary of the built-in module builtins is inserted under that key before the expression is parsed." This means __import__, open, exec, compile, and all other built-in functions are available inside the evaluated expression.

The validation before eval only checks 1) The function name matches ^[a-z]+[a-z]+ (snake_case pattern) and 2) The function name is in self.registered_functions.

The arguments to the function are not validated. If an attacker can influence the LLM's generated edit actions (via prompt injection through slide content, document content, or the command_list context), the following payload would execute arbitrary code:

# Attacker-controlled slide content feeds into the command_list context
# The coder LLM generates:
replace_image(1, "/tmp/img.png" if not __import__('os').system('id > /tmp/pwned') else "/tmp/img.png")

The func check passes (replace_image is registered), and the argument expression executes during . Then, the following trigger path in MCP mode is possible: