@zereight/mcp-gitlab has multiple safety-control bypasses: execute_graphql read-only + allow-list bypass, unauthenticated transports, session-exhaustion DoS

Summary

@zereight/mcp-gitlab exposes GitLab to an LLM agent while relying on read-only mode, a project allow-list, and transport auth as its safety controls. Five defects defeat those controls. Under the MCP threat model, tool-call arguments/content can be shaped by untrusted input (prompt injection) or a malicious client.

Reviewed commit: 60adcc0de5b0e96c4c2029f7a25d2775946421d8 (package version 2.1.28). Source review only; PoCs are local/offline.

• F1 (HIGH) execute_graphql defeats BOTH read-only mode and GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS.
• F2 (HIGH, deployment-conditional) Streamable HTTP /mcp unauthenticated under cookie-jar / device-flow credentials.
• F3 (MEDIUM) SSE unauthenticated by default, no Origin/Host validation (DNS rebinding).
• F4 (HIGH) unauthenticated session/transport-exhaustion DoS (token check is syntactic only).
• F5 (LOW) CI job trace returned verbatim (prompt-injection surface).

Details

F1 — index.ts:9194-9245 (case "execute_graphql"), guard at :9196, detector in utils/graphql-query.ts. (a) Read-only bypass: graphqlQueryContainsWriteOperation() strips comments/strings then tests /(?:^|[};]\s*)(mutation|subscription)\b/. GraphQL treats commas as insignificant, and stripGraphQLCommentsAndStrings does not remove them, so a document beginning with ,mutation{...} executes as a write but is classified read-only. (b) Allow-list bypass: the handler never calls getEffectiveProjectId() or rejectIfProjectScopedDeployment() (unlike other tools), so a raw GraphQL body reaches /api/graphql with the server token against any project the token can access, regardless of GITLAB_ALLOWED_PROJECT_IDS. execute_graphql is listed in readOnlyTools (tools/registry.ts:1288).

F2 — index.ts:1048-1052 forces REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION/GITLAB_MCP_OAUTH only when started with a PAT or job token; hasCookie (:1029) and useOAuth (:1026) are absent from the gate. Started with --cookie-path or --use-oauth, validation passes and mcpBearerAuth degrades to next() (:12903). Every /mcp caller is unauthenticated while buildAuthHeaders() attaches the server's live session upstream.

F3 — index.ts:12276 requireSseAuth is a pass-through when SSE_AUTH_TOKEN is unset (default), and the SSE transport (:12290) is created with no enableDnsRebindingProtection/allowedHosts/allowedOrigins. On the default loopback bind, a malicious web page can DNS-rebind to drive the local server with the operator's GitLab credentials.

F4 — index.ts:12387 validateToken only checks length>=20 and charset (no upstream verification); parseAuthHeaders returns AuthData for any such string; new sessions are admitted purely on capacity (:12938, MAX_SESSIONS default 1000), and the per-session rate limiter only runs when a sessionId already exists. So garbage-token initialize floods fill all session slots for SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 3600s) -> 503 for legitimate users.

F5 — index.ts:10898-10911 (get_pipeline_job_output) returns the CI job trace to the model verbatim. Job logs are attacker-influenceable (e.g. a fork MR pipeline), so embedded instructions become model context and, combined with F1, can escalate to writes.

PoC (local, deterministic)

F1 detector (replicates the shipped logic, no network): isWrite("mutation{deleteProject(input:{id:1}){errors}}") -> DETECTED isWrite(",mutation{deleteProject(input:{id:1}){errors}}") -> BYPASS (executes as a write under read-only mode)

F2 (local GitLab + cookie file): STREAMABLE_HTTP=true GITLAB_AUTH_COOKIE_PATH=./cookies.txt GITLAB_API_URL=http://localhost:8080/api/v4 node build/index.js # starts without an auth error; from another shell with NO credentials: curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3002/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream'
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"0"}}}'

F4 (REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION mode): for i in $(seq 1 1000); do curl -s -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:3002/mcp
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream'
-H 'Private-Token: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"x","version":"0"}}}'; done # subsequent legitimate initialize -> 503 "Maximum 1000 concurrent sessions allowed"

Impact

A semi-trusted client or a prompt-injected agent can perform arbitrary GitLab writes while the operator believes the server is read-only, against projects outside the allow-list, up to the token's privileges (F1). Anyone able to reach the port (directly or via DNS rebinding on loopback) can use the server's GitLab credentials with no authentication (F2/F3). An unauthenticated attacker can deny service with ~1000 trivial requests (F4). Attacker-influenced CI logs can steer the agent (F5).

Remediation

Parse execute_graphql with a real GraphQL parser and reject non-query operations; enforce project scope or disable the tool under an allow-list (F1). Extend the startup gate to (hasToken || hasJobToken || hasCookie || useOAuth) and ship a mandatory Streamable-HTTP auth token (F2). Enable SDK DNS-rebinding protection with allowedHosts/allowedOrigins and require SSE_AUTH_TOKEN by default (F3). Validate tokens upstream before allocating a session, rate-limit new-session creation per IP, lower idle timeout (F4). Frame externally-sourced content as untrusted and cap size (F5).